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Abstract
The present paper argues that, in line with Nelson-Phelps (1966), there exist important
complementaries among educational attainment, R and D activities (and their derived
innovations) and economic growth, although subject to a “skill-loss effect” ( -effect), due to
the presence of workers who have to perform jobs that require other capacities than the ones
they have. Taking Redding’s (1996) formal framework, the main result of our model suggests
that the more distorted the labour market is, the stronger must be the investment in R and D
necessary to at ain a positive economic growth rate.
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1. Introduction 
There exist two basic frameworks in which the relationship between education and 
growth can be modelled and analyzed. The first one was introduced by Lucas (1988), 
who emphasized on human capital accumulation as an alternative source of sustained 
growth, instead of only technological change. The second approach goes back to the 
seminal work of Nelson and Phelps (1966), in which growth is described as being 
driven by the stock of human capital (HK), which in turn affects the ability to innovate. 
Both approaches yield insights on the growth effects of educational policies.  
Further theoretical and empirical studies showed that the divergence in growth rates 
across countries could be due not so much to differences in the rates of accumulation of 
HK, as suggested by Lucas, but to differences in the corresponding levels (see for 
example Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994).  
The present paper argues that, in line with the Nelson-Phelps approach, (N&P from 
now) there exist important complementarities among educational attainment, R&D 
activities (and their derived innovations) and economic growth, although subject to a 
“skill-loss effect” (which we call δ -effect), due to the presence of workers who have to 
perform jobs that require other (or lower) capacities than the ones they have.  
Section II describes the δ -effect, that can be identified with the loss of acquired 
knowledge, as a result of disequilibrium in the labour market. Section III presents a 
formal model along the lines of Redding (1996), in which we introduce the 
parameterδ . Section VI introduces an empirical analysis for Argentina, in which we 
show that a distorted labor market can negatively affect the investment in human 
capital. Section V examines some policy implications and presents the conclusions.  
2. The δ -effect 
N&P presented the idea that one of the major roles of education is to increase the 
individual capacities to innovate and to adapt new technologies. Then, the rate of 
innovations would increase with the level of education attainment. Thus, the enrolment 
in secondary and higher education would best reflect the number of potential 
researchers/developers in an economy. This is consistent with the model of Romer 
(1990, in Aghion and Howitt 1999), in which the steady-state growth rate is an 
increasing function of the number of skilled workers. Therefore, the N&P approach 
shows that the marginal productivity of education attainment is an increasing function 
of the rate of technological progress. This implies that education should allow those 
countries with less advanced technologies to learn faster from the more advanced ones 
and thereby to achieve a higher productivity improvement in the adoption of 
innovations. 
A large empirical literature supports the N&P conclusions (for instance Benhabib and 
Spiegel 2005). Nevertheless, there exists an important group of empirical analyses that 
demonstrates that the educational level attained is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for growth (Azariadis and Drazen 1990, Ros 2003, Mariscal and Sokoloff 
2000, Krueger and Lindahl 2001, among others). 
While the empirical evidence shows that a high development of the human capital is not 
sufficient for reaching high levels of growth it also suggests something like a necessary 
condition: no country may follow a path of high economic growth without a continuous 
investment in human capital. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) observed, for the period 
1960-1980, that no country with low initial educational level could grow quickly. Later, 
in Ros (2003), Latin American countries are shown to be paradigmatic cases of the need 
for further conditions for a sustained growth process. Most of them, even with very high   2
initial levels of formal education, did not grow as fast as other countries that started 
with similar initial levels of human capital. This is particularly the case of Argentina, 
Uruguay and Panama, countries in which the average worker had more than four years 
of formal studies in 1960  but grew only at a 1.5% rate since then. An analogous 
conclusion is reached in the more historical study of Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000).  
Those studies pose the question of why investment in HK does, in some cases, fail to 
constitute a source of growth, while it succeeds at it in others. One of the possible 
answers emphasizes on some particular situations that may arise in the labour market. 
Notice that heterogeneity in technologies of production must be accompanied by 
heterogeneity in the formation of HK. But, as it is usual in developing countries, it may 
be the case that there exists a significant mismatch between the demand and supply of 
skills, which ends up with individuals employed to perform tasks unrelated to their 
training. Even worse, they may even remain unemployed. In these cases there is a “loss” 
of HK stock: workers have abilities that are not demanded (over-qualification), or they 
have to spend time at work to get the skills that are actually demanded, or worse yet, 
they remain unemployed. This situation can be called a “skill-loss effect”. We represent 
this by means of a parameterδ ,01 δ ≤ ≤ , an index that summarizes all the possible 
causes of HK depreciation, either because of unemployment, under or over 
employment. It takes value 1 when skills are not lost, and 0 when the loss is maximum.  
3. The model 
We investigate the relationship between HK and R&D when theδ -effect is introduced, 
and the consequences for economic growth. We follow the lead of Redding (1996). 
Let us consider a continuum of overlapping generations of individual workers, each of 
whom lives for 2 periods. The lifetime utility a worker of generation t is given by: 
   12 1 2 (, ) Ut c c c c ρ =+                                                                          (1) 
Where  cis consumption, andρ  is the discount factor. Therefore, individuals are risk 
neutral. They inherit or are born with one unit of human capital  1,t h (from investment in 
HK of the preceding generation), and invest a fraction u of their working time in their 
youth to increase it
I. Then: 
   2, 1, tt hh u
θ γ =+                                                                            (2) 
γ  is a parameter of efficiency of the educational system and 0<θ <1. Both γ and θ  
represent the social and institutional conditions of the system. The individual decision 
of how much time to devote to work or to study will be critical, depending if workers 
internalize or notδ -effect. 
We assume that each worker is randomly matched one-to-one with an entrepreneur, 
who also belongs to a continuum of overlapping generations. The joint effort, given by 
a linear technology, yields: 
   ,1 1 ,1 ..
ii
jt t jt yA h δ ++ + =                                                                        (3) 
1
i
t A +  is the ith entrepreneur’s productivity, while  ,1 . jt h δ +  denotes period j’s HK of the 
worker employed by i, adjusted by a δ -effect, 01 δ ≤ ≤
II. We do not consider unskilled 
work, assuming that all employees have a certain degree of education. Without taking 
into account this effect, i.e. before being employed, the actual value of human capital of 
                                                      
I We only consider high school and college education, where there exists an opportunity cost of studying, 
due to the potential wage at the market labour.  
II If  1 δ =  there is no δ -effect, since there are no distortions in the labour market, and all the 
accumulated human capital is productive.    3
an individual, depends on  , u γ  andθ . To avoid the interaction with other effects that 
may enhance the amount or the quality of HK, we do not assume that it can be obtained 
through learning-by-doing nor admit spillover effects among firms.  
Technology 
i A  will depend on the particular situation of each firm i, according to
MAX A , 
the leading-edge technology available in the economy.
III Entrepreneurs can invest a non-
monetary amount equal to a fraction α  of period 1’s output, inducing a jump in 
productivity from 
i A  to  A λ , closer to 
MAX A , where  1 λ ≥ . Additionally, there are two 
kinds of investment: on R&D (with a probability of successμ  , 0<μ <1 that represents 
the probability of developing a new technology
IV) or the purchase of new technologies. 
In the last case the increasing productivity will depend on the labour employed.  
According to the differences in their investment policies, there are two basic kinds of 
firms. On one hand those that produce innovations (and benefit from its temporary 
monopolistic rents
V). On the other those that work with past technologies. For the first 
class of firms, the general production function is: 
   ,1 1 ,1 .
in
jt t jt yA h λ ++ + =                                                                         (4) 
The δ -effect does not appear (or δ = 1) because we assume that in the innovating firms 
workers and technologies are perfectly matched, because the workers produce, using 
their skills and knowledge, these technologies. This is the case of Redding’s 
argument
VI. 
It is quite different for firms that produce with the old technology. First, it can be 
possible that theδ -effect operates due to disequilibria in the labour market. Second, the 
old technology has a lower productivity, represented the difference between  A and A λ . 
Then, the non-innovative firms have the following production function: 
   ,1 1 ,1 ..
non in
jt t jt yA h δ
−
++ + =                                                                       (5) 
From (4) and (5) we can obtain a global production function, considering that there are 
ainnovative firms and (1 ) a − no-innovative ones: 
   ,1 ,1 ,1 1 ,1 (1 ) ( (1 ). )
in non in
jt jt jt t jt ya y a y a a A h λδ
−
++ + + + =+ − = + −                (6) 
where the optimal amount obtains by producing 1, 1 tj t A h λ + + , i.e. in the absence of δ -
effect (1 ) δ = , or equivalently, when there are no non-innovative firms.  
Now assume that individual workers can obtain an income: 
   , (1 ) jt t wu A β = −                                                                             (7) 
at period 1, that represents the opportunity cost of studying, β  is the fraction of current 
product they earn. At period II, they can be matched with either an innovative or a no-
innovative firm. Then the expected wage will be: 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,1 (1 ) 1 1 j wu p A p A A
θ ργ β δ μ λ μ + ⎡⎤ =+ + − + − ⎣⎦              (8) 
Where  p is the probability to be employee at the innovative or non-innovative sector. 
Considering the intertemporal budget constraint: 
   1 2 , , ,1 ,1 (1 ) . jt jt jt jt cc w u h w h ρ ρ + + +≤ − +                                            (9) 
                                                      
III We assume that 
MAX A is idiosyncratic, and does not represent the international leading-edge.  
IV We assume a stochastic production of technology.  
V Monopolistic rents remain until a new technology is invented. At this time, the old technology is 
commonly known.  
VI This perfect match disappears if we consider that firms may have a R&D sector, separated from the 
productive sector.    4
The optimal allocation of time between current production and education when 
individuals internalize the possibility that δ -effect affects theirs futures salaries will 
solve the following maximization program: 
   () () () ( ) 1( 1 ) 1 1
u Max A u u p p
θ βρ γ δ μ λ μ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −+ + +− +− ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦         (10) 
The first order condition for (10) yields the equilibrium fraction of time of period one 
devoting to accumulate human capital: 
   () () () ()
1
1 11 up p
θ δλ μ μ ρ γ θ
− ⎡ ⎤ =+ − + − ⎣ ⎦  
    if      () () () ()
1
1 01 1 * p pu
θ δλ μ μ ρ γ θ
− ⎡⎤ ≤+ − + − < ⎣⎦                 (11) 
If (11) becomes ≥ u*, we consider that  * uu =   where  * u  is the highest fraction of time 
that, from a technical and practical point of view, people can assign to study (In other 
words, (1 *) u −  is the lowest fraction of time that individuals devote work). 
Equation (11) shows that u  is an increasing function of μ , the probability of 
innovating successfully; λ , the degree of technological progress; (1-p), the probability 
of being employed in an innovative firm; and γ  , the efficiency of educational system. 
In turn u  decreases onδ . 
The entrepreneurs will choose a R&D effort () α that maximizes benefits. We 
concentrate only on the innovative firm’s case, because their investment decisions will 
constitute the real source of growth of the economy, besides HK accumulation. We do 
not consider in this case the accumulation of capital as an endogenous source of growth, 
although is relatively easy to incorporate it. Then, innovators will choose their effort to 
maximize benefits: 
   ( )( ) { } () 1 1 ( 1 ) MAX B a A u u A
θ
α μμ α ρ β μ λ γ =− + − +− +              (12) 
From the first order condition:  
   () 1( 1 ) 0 au
θ αρ λ β γ −+ − + =   
   () 1( 1 ) u
a
θ ρλ β γ
α
−+
=                                                                    (13) 
When  () () 1( 1 ) / ua
θ αρ λ β γ ≤− + , innovators will invest. Note that α is an increasing 
function of  , u γ andθ , all capital human formation parameters, and arepresents the 
proportion of innovative firms in the economy. If 1 a = , is similar to Redding’s case. 
 
Comparative Static: from low-development trap to sustained-growth  
Given the previous analysis, there are many possible paths for this economy. We will 
analyse first the more pessimistic case: no growth. 
As remarked by Aghion and Howitt (1999), the strategic complementary between the 
workers’ choice of education and the firms’ R&D decisions may lead to a low-
development trap in which 0 μ = . Consider two main cases: without δ -effect (where all 
firms are innovative), case “R”, and our model. In the first case, the low-development 
trap implies that the time spent in studying is:  
   []
1
1
R u θ ργθ − =                                                                               (14) 
In our model,  
   () ()
1
1 1 up p θ δρ γ θ − ⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣ ⎦                                                         (15)   5
The difference between (14) and (15) is  () ()
1
1 1 pp θ δ − +− . That is, the time spent in 
studying is lower than in the first case. Without innovations, individuals that recognize 
the existence of δ -effect  will invest less time in studying, reinforcing the low-
development trap if we consider equation (13), in which the effort to innovate α  is a 
positive function of time spent in studying. An interesting empirical literature shows 
that for Latin American countries there is an important desertion in secondary schools, 
given by the high opportunity costs and the low probabilities of getting an employment 
in the more dynamics industries (Carlson 2002).  
When 0 μ > , a positive growth rate requires that  ( ) ( ) 1( 1 ) / ua
θ αρ λ β γ ≤− + , and 
   []
1
' 1 (( 1 ) R u θ μλ μ ργθ − =+ −                                                         (14’) 
              () ()
1
1 1(( 1 ) up p θ δμ λ μ ρ γ θ − ⎡ ⎤ =+ − + − ⎣ ⎦                                    (15’) 
 If people do not internalize δ -effect, the time spent to HK formation (in hours) is 
greater, being the 
'
R u  case. With the presence of no-innovative firms (0 ) p > the HK 
accumulation will be greater than optimal, given by the difference  () ()
1
1 1 pp θ δ − +− .  
An interesting result arises: in an economic system with marked differences among 
firms (innovative and no-innovative), the time devoted to study is greater if people hope 
to work in an innovative firm, with higher salaries, ignoring the δ -effect. If innovations 
are successful, the distance from  A to  A λ  increases, and the δ -effect is stronger, 
weighted up by p . But probably not all individuals will continue with the same 
expected salary function: some of them will consider u  and others  R u . As a dynamic 
problem, is this the first step towards a dual economy? 
From the analysis for the entrepreneurs, the main difference between our and Redding’s 
work is the proportion of innovative firms a in the economy:  () 1( 1 ) R u
θ αρ λ β γ =−+ , 
while our α  comes from equation (14). Being 01 a ≤ ≤ , it is possible that the effort in a 
mixed economy must be greater than in one in which all firms perfectly match workers 
and technology, considering both with the same parameters.   
 
4. A simple empirical assessment 
In this section we want to put to test some of the conclusions of the previous model. In 
particular, we check whether a distorted labor market can negatively affect the 
investment in HK. We do this by examining annual data for Argentina from 1990 to 
2005, provided by SITEAL
VII. Even with such a small data set we can detect that the 
conclusions of our model hold. 
We take the enrollment rate in elementary and high school as proxies of HK investment. 
On the other hand we use over-occupation
VIII as a proxy of a distorted labor market.  
The general empirical model is given by equation (1). 
                                                       01 tt t ER OO β βε = ++                                 (1)                                       
Where ER is for enrolment rate, OO is over-occupation, and  t ε  is a stationary process. It is 
expected that the sign of  t ε  will be negative, showing that a distorted labor market produces a 
reduction of the investment in HK.  
                                                      
VII http://www.siteal.iipe-oei.org/ 
VIII Under-occupation was not considered because the time series started in 1998.   6
As it is well known in econometrics, most of the economic series present a trend. But 
spurious regressions
IX are likely to be obtained by using traditional techniques (i.e.: 
ordinary least squares). Instead, it is common in time series analysis to use cointegration 
techniques. Finding a cointegration relationship is equivalent to obtain an economic 
long-run relationship.  
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Joselious (1990) proposed a method for testing the 
existence of cointegration vectors. As the first step in this analysis we have to analyze 
the existence of trends in the time series. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is 
usually applied in cases like this one, under the null-hypothesis that the process is non-
stationary. 
Table I and II show ADF test for the variables used in this study: 
 
Variable ERP ERS OO ERPM ERSM OOM
Trend and constant -4.180* -0.566 -2.512 -0.457 -0.623 -2.921
Constant -3.995* -0.903 -1.336 0.161 -0.937 -2.289
without trend and constant -1.968 -0.646 0.007 1.116 -0.676 0.382
Table I: ADF, Unit Root Test results. LEVELS
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%  
Variable D(ERP) D(ERS) D(OO) D(ERPM) D(ERSM) D(OOM)
Trend and constant -7.027* -3.864* -2.836 -3.868* -3.833* -3.341
Constant -6.745* -3.371* -3.164* -3.192* -3.393* -3.719*
without trend and constant -6.850* -3.422* -3.245* -3.073* -3.440* -3.870*
Table II: ADF, Unit Root Test results. FIRST DIFFERENCE
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%  
Note, from Table I and II that enrollment rate in elementary school (ERP), enrollment in 
high school (ERS), over-occupation (OO), and the respective proportion for the 
masculine population ERPM, ERSM, and OOM have all of them unit roots. Therefore, 
cointegration techniques are appropriate for these variables. However, given how small 
the sample is, we have to consider the results carefully.  
The second step in the study is to detect the existence of cointegrating vectors by using 
the Johansen test. We estimate four long-run relationships between ER and OO 
according to the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests. 
Once the cointegration relationship is obtained is important to study the existence of 
weak exogeneity. The importance of studying exogeneity is discussed in McCallum 
(1984). Weak exogeneity allows using the estimated equation without modeling the 
variable that we do not consider endogenous to the model. In the present case the 
variable is the distortion in the labor market approximated by OO. This variable is 
shown to be weakly exogenous. 
Table III shows the cointegrating relationship once controlled for weak exogeneity. 
                                                      
IX See Phillips (1986) for an analysis of spurious regressions   7
1) (ERP)    = 6.06 -0.377 (OO)
[ 3.69531] [-16.1062]
2) (ERS)    = 58.35 -14.64 (OO)
[-5.18217] [ 4.76857]
3) (ERPM)  = 6.84 -0.56 (OOM)
[-16.7269] [ 5.28760]
4) (ERSM)  = 56.85 -83.48 (OOM)
[-5.78285] [ 5.69390]
Source: Own elaboration
Table III: Cointegrating Relationship
 
All the equations present the correct signs. In particular, that an increment of distortion 
in the labor market generates a lower investment in human capital. Note from the first 
two equations that the effect is larger in the case of more “skilled” human capital. 
Enrollment in secondary education is more affected than in primary schooling by a 
distortion in the labor market. We note also, in 3) and 4), that the model using the 
investment in human capital for men is more affected than the general one by 
distortions in the labor market. 
Next we proceed to test for Granger causality for the different variables, Table IV 
shows the results. 
Sample: 1990 2005
Lags: 2
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
 OO does not Granger Cause ERP 14 3.140 0.092
 ERP does not Granger Cause OO 1.096 0.375
OO does not Granger Cause ERS 14 5.224 0.031*
ERS does not Granger Cause OO 3.488 0.076
  OOM does not Granger Cause ERPM 14 2.499 0.137
  ERPM does not Granger Cause OOM 0.874 0.450
 ERSM does not Granger Cause OOM 14 3.175 0.091
 OOM does not Granger Cause ERSM 3.971 0.058
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%
Table IV:  Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
 
Table IV suggests that unidirectional Granger-causality exists only from OO to ERS.  
These results reinforce the conclusions pointed out in the previous sections, in particular 
that individuals who recognize the existence of a δ -effect  will invest less time in 
studying, reinforcing the low-development trap. The aforementioned empirical analysis 
shows, in fact, that the investment on human capital is reduced when the distortion in 
the labor market increases.  This result is stronger for men than for women and for high 
school than for primary school.  
5. Preliminary Conclusions 
This is a model that presents a variation of Redding’s argument. First, there is a δ -
effect according to which the human capital accumulated is partially lost due to 
imperfections in matching technologies and worker’s skills. The other difference,   8
complementary to the first, is to consider the possibility of a variety of firms, 
represented by two main groups: innovative and no-innovative firms. To illustrate the 
differences in efficiency, we assumed that the first ones match perfectly its workers with 
their technology, but the latter don’t.  
Under this new setting, the possibility to reach a higher growth is more difficult and it 
requires a greater effort in R&D’ investment, which is in turn discouraged  by lower 
amount of time devoted to accumulate human capital when individuals recognize the 
δ -effect . The general policy recommendation in the literature, namely to increase the 
HK formation, does not ensure a sustained growth process when the probability to find 
work in an innovative firm is low, and the distance between  A and  A λ  is growing, in 
fact, in presence of a high δ -effect  and a high proportion of non-innovative firms, it 
can engender a vicious circle, making δ  endogenous
X.  
Perhaps it is necessary to include in this analysis differences in the HK formation, with 
the possibility to have a perfect match in both innovative and no-innovative firms. The 
current discussion about the role of the formal educational system in Argentina is 
focusing on the necessity of a careful design of study programmes, in order to satisfy 
the labour demand (local and international), technological progress, and the inner 
dynamic of the firms. Assuming that not all firms are innovative, the fist step to reach 
higher growth rates is to diminish the weight of the δ -effect. 
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